Cloud providers are well aware of these concerns, as demonstrated in a recent roundtable including senior staff representing the sector's major companies. 2 One participant stated that his company has "very strict procedures in place for when our employees are allowed to access the machines the customer data resides on. We keep track of every action they take on those machines, and we log all that information for later audits so that we can ensure that all employees are behaving consistently with our privacy policy." Another participant added, "We have zero tolerance for insiders abusing that trust."
Although these policies are important-even essentialthey fall short of solving the problem. Preventing physical access is not effective against remote attacks, and monitoring or auditing only detects an attack after it happens, which is usually too late. Interestingly, a participant in that same roundtable replied to a question about security and trust in the cloud by stating that "there are some things that will never go into [the cloud], for example, our SAP back end."
So how can an organization store confidential and private data in the cloud in a way that prevents its disclosure by malicious attacks inside the cloud? To the best of our knowledge, no single current approach solves this problem. Instead, some options include providing isolated environments 3 via trusted computing and the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). 4, 5 DepSky prevents data disclosures but only in storage clouds via replication. 6 M any companies have embraced the benefits of cloud computing because of its pay-per-use cost model and the elasticity of resources that it provides. But from a data confidentiality and privacy viewpoint, moving a company's IT systems to a public cloud poses some challenges. System protection is often based on perimeter security, but in the cloud, the company's systems run on the cloud provider's hardware and coexist with software from both the provider and other cloud users. Simply put, the cloud blurs the formerly clear separation between the trusted inside and the untrusted outside.
Although researchers have identified numerous security threats to the cloud, 1 malicious insiders still represent a significant concern. Security threats take on new dimensions in this new environment, as cloud operators and system administrators are unseen, unknown, and not onsite. Confidential data such as passwords, cryptographic keys, or files are just a few commands away from access by a malicious or incompetent system administrator. 
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A proposed solution based on the TPM offers protection against malicious insider threats in infrastructure-as-aservice (IaaS) clouds.
INFRASTRUCTURE AS A SERVICE
The National Institute of Standards and Technology identifies three classifications for cloud services: infrastructure as a service, platform as a service, and software as a service. 7 We focus here on IaaS because it provides the user with the highest level of control over the infrastructure.
The main enabler of IaaS is native, or type I, virtualization. 8 This technology first appeared in the late 1960s in IBM mainframes such as the System/360. In native virtualization, the hardware-typically a server-runs a layer of software called a hypervisor or VM monitor that supports the execution of several virtual machines (VMs) with their own operating systems and software instances. The hypervisor essentially provides each VM with both an interface that is almost indistinguishable from the hardware and isolation from other VMs. For almost a decade, hypervisors were simply a software layer, but their efficiency today relies on hardware support from mainstream processors.
IaaS cloud services such as Amazon EC2, Rackspace, and Eucalyptus provide an interface for instantiating VMs from system images. Users can, for instance, request 50 VMs by running an image of a certain version of Linux and the Tomcat application server. Resources are elastic in the sense that the cloud can instantiate or delete VMs dynamically. The cloud provides APIs to help with load balancing among application servers. Figure 1 offers a simplified representation of an IaaS infrastructure that shows three of possibly tens of thousands of cloud servers, each running VMs from one or more users. The servers contain a special VM that supports management operations such as launching a VM, deleting a VM, taking a snapshot of a VM's memory, migrating a VM to a different server, monitoring VM performance, and backing up VM files.
INSECURITY
A recent report about the Community Emergency Response Team's insider threat database found more than 550 insider attacks, including cases of sabotage, fraud, and intellectual property theft. 9 The report did not mention cloud computing specifically, but the threat in this context is clear from more recent cases, such as that of a disgruntled ex-employee of cloud storage provider CyberLynk. His attack deleted one entire season of a TV show of one of the company's clients (www.courthousenews. com/2011/03/31/35406.htm).
Because IaaS gives cloud users more control over infrastructure, cloud providers necessarily have less control over it. In fact, providers own just a limited layer of software-the hypervisor and the management VM. Although this should limit what a malicious insider can do with a user's VMs and data, it is not enough. A recent study found three devastating yet simple-to-execute malicious insider attacks in IaaS clouds, 10 all of which assume the cloud's administrators have log-in access to the management VM and can run two operations: taking a snapshot of the VM's memory and mounting logical disk volumes. In this study, the hypervisor was Xen and the management VM was Xen's domain 0 with Linux (Xen's default management VM). The attacks happened as follows:
• Extraction of cleartext passwords from a VM's memory.
Systems often store passwords in memory as cleartext, so the first attack required only three steps. First, the attacker ran Xen's xm dump-core command in the console to obtain a memory snapshot and store it in a file. Then, the attacker ran the strings command to extract strings from that file. Finally, he launched a dictionary attack with these strings to get both log-in passwords and the Apache Web server passphrases used to protect private keys.
• Extraction of private keys from a VM's memory. Systems typically store private keys of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as RSA in memory. At first glance, these keys are numbers, so they might seem indistinguishable from other data. However, they are usually stored in standard formats, such as PKCS#1, whose byte patterns are identifiable. The second attack consisted simply of running the xm dump-core command to obtain a memory snapshot and the rsakeyfind tool to search for certain byte patterns and extract the keys.
• Extraction of files from the disk. Xen typically uses Linux's logical volume manager (LVM), which attackers can use to obtain a copy of a VM's files. The third attack consisted of running lvcreate to create a new volume with a copy of all the VM files, kpartx to add a partition map to the new volume, vgscan to obtain the new volume's name, vgchange to activate the volume, and mount to make it accessible as a normal file system.
A cloud administrator's access to the management VM makes these attacks possible. Although a malicious cloud administrator can perform these attacks, another cloud user or a malicious insider in the user's infrastructure cannot exploit it.
TRUSTED COMPUTING
To the best of our knowledge, the term trusted computing first appeared in the early 2000s to designate the work of what later became the Trusted Computing Group (TCG; www.trustedcomputinggroup.org). The key idea was that security must be based on a few mechanisms implemented in hardware, such as cryptographic key storage. Hardware-based security is far from new, but the TCG made important contributions by creating a standard hardware component, the Trusted Platform Module, 11 and defining a set of core functions based on this component.
Trusted Platform Module
The TPM chip is currently found on the motherboard of many commercial PCs (its presence can be checked in the BIOS settings). It is supposed to be tamperproof, providing a set of functions that the software in the PC can call with the assistance of a device driver and a library for the programming language used.
The TPM essentially contains functional units and memory. As Table 1 indicates, the TPM's functional units are related to cryptography, including random number generation, key generation, hash functions, and RSA encryption.
Nonvolatile memory stores two important public/private key pairs whose private parts never leave the TPM-the endorsement key (EK) and storage root key-as well as a password called the owner authorization secret key. The EK uniquely identifies a TPM, whereas the storage root key encrypts keys to be stored outside the TPM; memory available inside the TPM is limited. Volatile memory stores several keys and handles, as well as a minimum of 16 platform configuration registers (PCRs) that store measurements, that is, cryptographic hashes of code modules.
Root of trust for measurement
Systems typically use the TPM and PCRs to provide a root of trust for measurement (RTM). The objective is to give reliable measurements for assessing whether the system is in a trusted state-that is, to verify its integrity. These measurements are cryptographic hashes of certain code modules, such as the master boot record (MBR) or the operating system kernel. Cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1 or SHA-256 are collision resistant, meaning it is computationally infeasible to find a different input that provides the same output/hash. Therefore, if a certain code module has a hash h1, it is impossible to substitute it with different code with the same hash h1.
When a system such as a server turns on, the PCRs are set to zero. In the boot process, several modules run in sequence, each one starting the next one-first the BIOS, then the MBR, the kernel, and so forth. To create the root of trust, each module calculates and stores in one PCR the hash of the next module. The BIOS provides a static RTM (SRTM) in the sense that it is trusted to provide the TPM with the correct hash of the first module it executes. This process creates a set of hashes in the TPM that the component can provide to challengers-processes in other computers charged with verifying whether the system is in a trusted state, meaning the system is running a certain version of the MBR characterized by having a certain hash, a certain version of the kernel, and so on. As presented, this process has a serious vulnerability: after booting a configuration (MBR, kernel) that challengers do not consider trusted, the system modifies some of the PCRs in the TPM to hashes that the challengers trust; this would trick the challengers into believing that the configuration is the one the hashes represent, when this is not the case. To avoid this, the TPM does not have an operation to write a value into a PCR, only to extend a PCR. So, instead of storing the hash provided by whatever calls the TPM in a PCR, the extension operation stores a hash of the PCR's previous value concatenated with the input hash. Due to the collision resistance property, it is impossible to extend a PCR so that its state becomes a trusted hash. This means that the TPM design itself avoids this vulnerability.
The SRTM requires the BIOS to be trusted, which could be problematic because it is possible to change BIOS content. The notion of dynamic RTM (DRTM), which was made possible by AMD's Secure Virtual Machine (SVM) and Intel's Trusted Execution Technology extensions to the x86 architecture, removes this limitation. 4 The main difference between SRTM and DRTM is that the latter enables the system to start protected code at any time, not just at boot time. For this to be possible, the extensions provide instructions to put the CPU in a clean state, akin to a restart, but from which it is possible to return to normal operation. This clean state represents a new root of trust.
Remote attestation
One use for an RTM is remote attestation, which allows challengers to verify a remote system's integrity simply by asking for the values of some of its PCRs. Figure 2 illustrates the remote attestation process for a challenging computer (bottom) attesting a server (top). Before the process starts, the server requires its TPM to create an attestation identity key (AIK) pair (step 0.1), obtains the public key, and then registers this key in a certification authority (CA) that issues a signed certificate (0.2). The remote attestation process officially starts with the challenging computer asking the CA for the certificate (1) and then asking the server for attestation-that is, for the values of a set of PCRs (2) . The server obtains these PCR values signed with the AIK (3) from the TPM and sends them to the challenging computer (4). Finally, the challenging computer verifies the signature, which only the TPM can make, and determines whether the PCR values correspond to a trusted configuration (5) .
However, remote attestation suffers from a major problem: although a challenger might consider a software module as trusted, this does not mean that it is trustworthy. The module might be plagued with buffer-overflow and command-injection vulnerabilities that would let an attacker subvert its operation. The number of vulnerabilities in software is believed to be proportional to its size, so reducing the attested code size is an important goal. More precisely, attestation should be done only on securitycritical software, the Trusted Computing Base. 4 This is a problem for SRTMs in particular because the complete operating system kernel must be trusted for trust to be put in modules loaded later in the system. With a DRTM, it is possible to attest smaller modules.
PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY
To protect data confidentiality and privacy, the cloud must prevent certain attacks and give users the ability to assess whether the necessary mechanisms are in place, instead of simply trusting the cloud provider. This latter requirement might seem excessive, but the potential problem here is a malicious insider who might return arbitrarily incorrect information on the provider's behalf, so a solution can't be based on trusting the same provider.
User VMs reside in the cloud in three places: in servers (as in Figure 1 ), in the network during deployment and migration, and backed up on disks. To prevent data disclosure, users should limit what someone can do with the VM on a server and force it to be encrypted on the network and when backed up. Therefore, servers must run a trusted virtualization environment (TVE), comprising a hypervisor and a management VM that will not provide certain operations to administrators (such as snapshots and volume mount, due to the aforementioned vulnerabilities) and will support only trusted versions of others (launch, migrate, and backup VMs). Referring to one TVE is a simplification; cloud users can trust several TVE configurations with access to these TVEs' hashes and measurements. To attain the second aspect of this proposed solution, users can check these hashes with attestation. This process requires a public-key infrastructure (PKI) to provide certificates with public AIKs; the CA in Figure 2 is part of this PKI. Managing and distributing the measurements might require a third party, which could be the PKI provider or a different organization.
During server boot, the TPM's PCRs store the measurements of several loaded modules. Users can ensure that the hypervisor and management VM are loaded in a particular server via these hashes. This process is especially important to ensure that certain operations are not provided, such as memory snapshots, volume mount, and untrusted VM migration. It is not enough to provide a trusted VM migration operation:
5 a malicious administrator could let the user's VM launch in a server with a TVE and allow the attestation to finish, but then relocate the VM to a server that does not contain a TVE, just a hypervisor such as Xen with memory snapshots available. This administrator could then perform attacks.
A DRTM-based solution can help prove to cloud users that the modules responsible for launching, migrating, or destroying their VMs are trustworthy; we call these trusted cloud operation modules (TCOMs). To the best of our knowledge, only one efficient implementation exists for DRTM-based attestation-TrustVisor, which is based on the idea of two-level integrity measurement. 4 TrustVisor uses both the hardware TPM and a software μTPM (which provides similar functionality) to extend TCOM measurement into the μTPM during runtime, when the module is needed. This removes the TPM from attestations done during runtime, which is important because TPM operations are slow (signatures take approximately 500 ms in some versions). Furthermore, TrustVisor isolates TCOM memory during its execution, thereby creating an isolated execution environment (IEE).
VM OPERATIONS
The most critical VM operations-launching, migrating, backing up, and destroying-involve interaction among four components: the server agent, the TCOM of each operation in the server, the user agent, and the cloud management agent. The user agent is naturally trusted; the TCOM and server agent are trusted because they are subject to remote attestation. A malicious insider can control the cloud management agent, so it is not trusted.
Launching a VM
As Figure 3 shows, to launch the VM, the user agent requests it by contacting the cloud management agent. This agent then selects a server on which to launch the VM (the scheduling operation) and informs the user agent and the server agent about this decision. The server agent obtains the VM either from storage in the cloud or from the user agent directly.
The server agent uses TrustVisor to create an IEE in which to start the VM launch TCOM. Then, the user agent does a DRTM-based attestation of this module and uses a simple protocol to send it key K to decrypt the VM. In this protocol, the TCOM sends the user agent its public key PK, the user agent encrypts K with PK and sends it, and the TCOM uses the corresponding private key to obtain K. Encryption prevents anyone from observing the VM content in the network.
Finally, the TCOM launches the VM. The module's execution in an IEE prevents the administrator from obtaining the key from the management VM memory itself.
VM migration
VM migration is slightly more complex. In addition to performing a DRTM-based attestation of the VM's migration of TCOM in the origin server, the user agent also must attest the TCOM in the destination server. This ensures that the VM is moving into a TVE and that the entire process runs under the control of trustworthy modules. Prior to migration, the TCOM must encrypt the VM in the origin server so that it is unreadable while it transfers through the network. This involves sending a session key similar to what happens in the launching process. Notice that the process starts with the cloud management agent and that, unlike VM migration in current clouds, this solution requires the user agent to actively participate in the beginning of the operation (to do the first attestation) and therefore be aware of the migration process.
VM backup
Backing up a VM requires steps similar to launching a VM: after the initial signaling from the cloud infrastructure, the user agent attests the module, the agent and the module establish a session key, and the module encrypts the VM. The process finishes with the module sending the encrypted VM to its destination and deleting the key.
VM termination
To securely terminate a VM, the hypervisor must clean the memory region and disk space used during VM execution. This is paramount to avoid leaking confidential data to the next VM that uses that memory region. If information leaks here, an attacker could use a special-purpose VM randomly launched in public cloud infrastructures to find the confidential data left forgotten in RAM. Attestation must be used again to ensure that this module is trustworthy.
Because the AIK is simply an RSA key pair, the cloud must prove to the user that a real TPM created this pair, not a malicious insider. For this purpose, the TPM must provide both the public AIK, in a certificate signed by the TPM's private EK, and the certificate with the public EK, which states that a certain TPM vendor created it and has a valid certificate chain to a root CA, such as Verisign.
T he solution we present here has one main problem: the gap between a measurement (a hash) and a complex software module's functionality. Checking that a hash belongs to a list of trusted hashes is trivial, but actually trusting that a hash represents a trustworthy complex module is quite different. This is particularly true for vulnerabilities in hypervisors or anomalies in virtualization that can allow a malicious user VM to attack another one. 12 Clearly, work remains to be done related to trustworthy hypervisors, management VMs, and the operation modules we propose.
Another research topic is the management of such a solution in a production environment. Different companies will develop different software modules, and various evaluation organizations will evaluate and certify the modules, measurements, and cloud providers. All these organizations must cooperate effectively under the pressure of a short time to market. An additional issue is updating the measurements and revoking those that correspond to modules that eventually become untrusted.
Although we focused here on reinforcing the cloud infrastructure with trusted computing mechanisms, an entirely different approach distributes trust among several cloud providers. The idea is that the user does not trust the cloud provider and its administrators but instead trusts that there is no collusion among malicious insiders of more than a certain number of clouds. Currently, this idea has been applied in the context of cloud computing by a single system, DepSky, 6 whose purpose is to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored in the cloud. To do this, DepSky scatters data in storage clouds from four different providers, using Byzantine quorum system algorithms to assure data integrity and availability, even in the presence of data losses or corruptions in some of the clouds. This solution allows the implementation of secure storage clouds, but it is unclear how it can be extended to support replicated VMs.
